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During the last three decades, emotions have become a critical topic in several 
branches of the contemporary philosophical debate, ranging from metaethics 
and value epistemology to philosophical psychology and normative ethics. 
Emotions are supposed to play a crucial role in our life, with a strong impact on 
our first-person experience and our social interactions, on our choices and 
values but also our implicit attitudes and unintentional behavior. Thinking of 
emotions, philosophers have focused on affective phenomena as diverse as 
disgust with the smell of rotten meat, awe for a magnificent musical composition, 
fear of snakes, hope for the future of a cherished friend, and embarrassment over 
a slight deviation from a social norm. It is indeed a theoretical challenge to 
account for the full spectrum of what ordinarily falls under the term “emotion” 
and to identify its place in the broader affective domain, to the extent that the 
very unity of the category is disputed.  
As a consequence, despite virtually all philosophers’ agreement on 
their relevance, emotions are understood in a broad variety of philosophical 
perspectives. Some scholars highlight the cognitive import of emotions and 
argue that they are a sort of evaluative judgment, others explain emotions in 
terms of bodily changes that result in a kind of perception of value, and still 
others appeal to the idea of bodily attitudes or action tendency.  
The purpose of this special issue is to collect relevant studies to 
facilitate interaction between different perspectives via a focus on single 
emotions. The core idea of the special issue has two facets. Firstly, the volume 
aims to show how different theoretical frameworks on emotions influence the 
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philosophical analysis and description of a specific emotion. Secondly, as the 
title “Emotions: From Cases to Theories” makes explicit, we also want to 
explore the matter the other way around. In-depth analysis of a single emotion, 
in our view, is a good way to make evident the merits—and the limits—of a given 
theoretical approach and to allow us to concretely grasp relevant differences 
among diverse theories.  
The issue begins with no less than three contributions devoted to 
empathy, compassion, and related emotional events. This fact testifies to the 
liveliness of philosophical interest in this range of emotions. 
In her paper, “Resentment, Empathy and Indignation,” Jacqueline Taylor links 
resentment to sympathy and indignation. From Aristotle to Martha Nussbaum, 
philosophical tradition has often deemed resentment as a destructive emotion. 
Taylor joins other philosophers, such as A. Smith, D. Hume, J. Butler, and P. F. 
Strawson, in considering resentment as a form of anger targeting injury or 
injustice and, as such, an essential item in moral and social relations. 
Particularly, she argues that sympathetic indignation, felt in concord with 
another’s resentment, can rectify injustices and moral wrongs. 
In “Compassion without Cognitivism,” Charlie Kurth offers a defence 
of a sophisticated account of compassion, arguing that it is not a parochial 
emotion and it doesn’t lack motivational force when directed beyond our friends 
and family. Kurt claims that to vindicate the moral value of compassion, we don’t 
need to adopt a cognitivist approach. 
In a similar vein, in “‘I Don’t Want Your Compassion!’”, Manuel 
Camassa opposes the philosophers and psychologists, such as Jesse Prinz and 
Paul Bloom, who find empathy useless or even dangerous. Camassa claims that 
empathy involves a peculiar psychological mechanism and must be 
distinguished from similar emotions such as compassion. Furthermore, even if 
empathy is not necessary for moral judgment, it plays a crucial role in moral 
development and moral conduct. 
In “Making Sense of Emotional Contagion,” Carmen Isern-Mas and 
Antoni Gomila focus not on a specific emotion, but on the complex 
phenomenon of emotional contagion. The authors criticize the mimicry theory, 
according to which emotional contagion is mediated by an automatic process of 
mimicry of the perceived expressive movements and argue instead for a general 
theory of emotion elicitation. Thus, emotional contagion is better understood 
as an emotional response. 
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Lorenzo Greco’s paper, “On Pride,” focuses on a related but different 
topic. The author presents the traditional commendation of pride by Christian 
ethics. In doing so, he examines B. Mandeville’s view, according to which pride is a 
beneficial passion to society, even if it’s a vice for the individual, and then he reviews 
the Humean conception of pride and its place in moral life. In a typical Humean 
fashion, Greco defends pride as a virtue and discards humility as a vice. 
Alessandra Fussi, in “Envy and Its Objects,” develops a detailed analysis of 
envy through a deep confrontation with the most relevant philosophical accounts. 
Firstly, she carefully presents envy as an emotion surrounded by several related 
emotions such as covetousness, longing, emulation, and admiration, which makes 
the categorization of envy problematic. In what follows, Fussi offers a fresh proposal 
for categorizing envy by critically discussing the well-established distinction 
between object-envy and state-envy made by G. Taylor. Working on variations of 
situational factors, Fussi argues that the ultimate object of envy is fame—and not the 
good one lacks—and that something like benign envy doesn’t exist. 
Maria Silvia Vaccarezza’s “Admiration, Moral Knowledge and 
Transformative Experiences” fits with the renewed interest in the moral role of 
admiration both in psychology and philosophy. After presenting the main 
taxonomies and definitions of admiration, she engages in a critical discussion of 
Zagzebski’s account of admiration as a reliable source of moral judgments, arguing 
that on the one hand, we have to allow admiration to provide prima facie normative 
reasons, but on the other hand, this provisional, emotive source of justification is 
often enough and sometimes is all we have. In the last sections, the author applies 
her analysis of admiration as a source of moral development to the case of 
transformative experiences. 
Claudia Navarini and Ettore De Monte, in “Fear as Related to Courage: An 
Aristotelian-Thomistic Redefinition of Cognitive Emotions,” elaborate on the 
connection between fear and courage by developing an account based on Aristotle’s 
and Aquinas’s insights combined with recent findings in emotion theories and 
empirical research. They argue that the virtue of courage has an intrinsic relation 
with the experience of fear that constitutes a precondition for courage itself. In other 
words, courageous agents do not rule out fear or merely struggle against it; instead 
they feel fear appropriately within the broader disposition of courage. 
Tiziana Migliore, in “On Courage: The Sense of θυμός,” conducts a wide 
and careful etymological and historical analysis of the concept of θυμός (thymòs) 
not only in philosophical psychology, but first and foremost in Greek 
historiography, literature, and medicine. By doing so, the author effectively shows 
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how complex and broad the meaning of θυμός was in ancient Greek culture. On this 
basis, the article goes on to articulate the relevance of the “thymic dimension” for 
semiotics and develops an original discussion of the role played by thymòs-related 
themes in the contemporary practice of tattooing.  
Danilo Manca, in “Shades of Schadenfreude: A Phenomenological 
Account of Pleasure at Another’s Misfortune,” intertwines different philosophical 
traditions on Schadenfreude and provides a multifaceted and erudite introduction 
to this emotion. In the first section, the author puts forward an original 
interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of epichairekakia, relying on the 
phenomenological distinction between “noematic” and “noetic.” The paper 
proceeds by discussing how Schadenfreude relates to “ressentiment” in the modern 
framework informed by Scheler’s and Nietzsche’s views. The third section is 
devoted to integrating the analysis of Schadenfreude with major current theories of 
humor and laughter. Finally, the author applies his analysis to the peculiar case of 
philosophical attitude.  
Alexander A. Jeuk’s “Concern and the Structure of Action: The 
Integration of Affect and Understanding” explores the idea of the prominent role of 
action in human existence emphasized by phenomenologists. The author elaborates 
on the Heideggerian notion of “concern” in order to improve the 
phenomenologically inspired embodied-cognition approach, which, despite the 
centrality it places on action to explain cognition, has been criticized for lacking a 
proper theory of action per se. The core of the paper develops an account of action 
based on the integration of affect and embodied understanding that together 
constitute concern, the main structural condition that motivates action. 
The issue is completed by two very intriguing papers. The first one, by 
Larry A. Herzberg, “On Sexual Lust as an Emotion,” tries to overcome the 
traditional view of sexual lust as a desire or an appetite. Instead, according to 
Herzberg, sexual lust intersects with the usual categories and resembles desires, 
appetites, and emotions. There are philosophical, psychological, and neurological 
reasons to conclude prima facie that sexual lust rides on both sides, even if further 
research is needed. 
In “Emotions and Literature: Robert Musil’s Young Törless,” Zeynep 
Talay Turner doesn’t focus on a specific emotion but deals with a long-standing 
topic concerning the relationship between emotions, literature, and philosophy. In 
particular, she explores the connections between literature and sympathy through 
Robert Musil’s theory of emotion. 
 
